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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH in the 
interest of 
KENNETH EUGENE MARQUEZ 
A person under eighteen 
years of age. 
Case No. 14571 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
There are basic misunderstandings in Respondent's 
analysis of this case as reflected in its brief. Therefore 
Appellant shall analyze the brief submitted by Respondent, 
giving reference to the page numbers of its brief wherein a 
point is asserted. 
POINT I 
THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE FINGERPRINT RECORDS OF THE ACCUSED 
WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION THAT SUCH FINGER-
PRINTS WERE TAKEN IN COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND JUVENILE COURT 
RULES. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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The State concedes that Utah Code Annotated §55-10-1 16 
(1953), is the sole authority for the taking of a child's 
fingerprints (p.2). That statute requires the consent of a 
juvenile court judge, and is embodied in Rule 39, Utah 
Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure (U.J.C.R.P.P.; 
Therefore, to be properly admissible, there must be adequate 
foundation laid by the state to show compliance with the 
statutory mandate. 
However, the State asks the court to ignore on unreaso1.c: 
1 
I 
public policy grounds Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
which require that the Utah Rules shall apply in every 
proceeding, whether criminal or civil. In so advocating, 
the State also implies that the Court should disregard the 
constitutional guarantees set forth in In re Gault, 387 
I 
I 
U.S. 1 (1967), Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966), and In re::_I 
An adult confronted with the , 397 U.S. 358 ( 197 0) ' (p. 3). 
introduction of fingerprint evidence is entitled to the 
benefit of assessing at trial the adequacy of the foundati~ 
laid for admission. The legislature recognized the necessi:y 
of adding an additional protection for juveniles by enactin~ 
§55-10-116, Utah Code Ann. (1953). To deny the effect of 
these cases and the Utah statute is not only reversible 
error but would make a mockery of the Court's and the Le9is· 
lature' s attempts to confer additional protection on juvent'.''' 
-2-
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The State further contends (p.4) that absent an illegal 
detention or where prints are given voluntarily, there is no 
basis for objection to the admission of fingerprint evidence. 
People v. Hann~man, 507 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1973), Redd v. Decker, 
447 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1971). Mr. Marquez does not challenge 
the sufficiency of these legal arguments, but contests their 
application here, since without the benefit of sufficient 
foundation as to compliance with §55-10-116 and Rule 39, 
U.J.C.R.P.P., it is impossible to know under what circum-
stances the prints were obtained or whether or not they were 
given voluntarily. Without foundation, the State's arguments 
are premature, and Mr. Marquez is without sufficient knowledge 
upon which to base an objection at trial. 
State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970) is 
cited (p.4) for the proposition that fingerprints may be 
taken absent a warrant of arrest. However, where a statute 
such as 55-10-116 and Rule 39 U.J.C.R.P.P. set forth the 
circumstances under which prints of a juvenile may be taken, 
use of this case as authority is improper. A close reading 
of State v. Dillon, supra, also reveals that the Idaho court 
ruled that fingerprints are protected from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
The State argues (p.5) that it is a "hazardous guess at 
best that the legislature would have afforded juveniles the 
-3-
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protection found in the statute at the cost of allowin~ 
juvenile offenders to escape punishment." 
contention that the legislature recognized the need to 
protect the juvenile who is often ignorant, naive and too 
immature to identify and articulate his or her individual 
rights, and that a juvenile offender must have the benefit 
of not having fingerprints taken without judicial consent. 
The State argues that to deny admittance of such evidence 
would be paramount to allowing juveniles to escape punish-
ment. Such an assumption is beyond the parameters of the 
issue, since a determination of guilt or innocence and 
sentencing is a function of the judiciary apart from a 
finding that a piece of evidence is competent. 
That the State in good faith advocates Mr. Marquez 
could have or should have compelled destruction of the 
record (p.51 would be, if accepted, a travesty. A juvenile 
should not have to remedy what might have been improper 
actions of the state and under no circumstances is under any 
affirmative duty to do so. Stone v. Powell, 44 U.S.L.W. 
5313 (U.S. July 6, 1976), U.S. v. Jains, 44 U.S.L.W. 5303 
(U.S. July 6, 1976), People v. Coleman, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 
533 P.2d 1024 (1975). 
The State enters into a lengthy discussion of the 
Supreme Court's resistence to the expansion of the scope of 
the exclusionary rule and cites substantial authority for 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
its proposition. (p.7) State v. Powell, 144 U.S.L.W. 5313 
(U.S. July 6, 1976), U.S. v. Jains, 44 U.S.L.W. 5303 (U.S. 
July 6, 1976). 
However, it is the State's argument that a criminal 
defendant cannot require a prosecutor to lay a foundation to 
show that all evidence admitted was legally obtained. 
However, Mr. Marquez urges recognition that the question 
before the court is not whether the evidence should have 
been suppressed but whether or not the state failed to meet 
its burden in supplying the court with evidence as to suffi-
cient foundation and whether the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence proffered without proof of compliance with the 
statute. 
Finally, the State argues (p. 10) that peace officers 
must not be unduly hampered in investigative attempts, State 
I 
~ 
v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d 1349 (1972), without a 
corresponding benefit being provided. This standard when 
applied to the facts herein is ludicrous. The benefit to be 
gained is clearly the protection of the rights of juveniles 
as provided by 55-10-116 and the U.S. Constitution. 
POINT II 
THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN DECLARING FINGERPRINT RECORDS 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS 
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. 
-5-
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The rule of People v. Zerbes, 6 Cal. 2d 425, 57 P.2d 
1319 (1936) is still sound judicial precedent which should 
be adopted by the court. Zerbe~, supra, holds that where 
the state's fingerprint expert had not known the person 
fingerprinted personally and had not personally recorded the 
prints, the experts testimony was hearsay and the card 
properly rendered incompetent. This is the situation in the 
instant case. 
The State cites People v. Crosslin, 251 Cal. App. 968, 
60 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1967) as the better California rule 
(p.11). In California, fingerprint evidence is admissible 
under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act codefeed 
as §1953f of the California Code of Civil Procedure where 
the foundation for admitting the record is properly laid, 
i.e. "if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of infono· 
tion, method and time of preparation were such as to justify 
its admission. (p. 314 Cal. Rptr.). In the Crosslin case, 
foundation was deemed sufficient where a police captain 
testified that he had taken fingerprints for numerous years, 
related in detail how prints were prepared, explained what 
various numbers appearing on the card signified, identified 
who prepared cards, and testified that he checked the date 
and numbers on defendant's card and found the card to be in 
the correct location, and that the card was prepared int~ 
normal course of business on the date the defendant was 
arrested. 
-6-
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Testimony at trial in the instant case in no manner 
meets the standard set forth in Crosslin, and therefore the 
zerbes rule continues to be applicable. 
POINT III 
EVEN ASSUMING FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE IS 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RE.CORDS 
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, THE 
JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
FINGERPRINT RECORDS BECAUSE OF IN-
SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION UNDER THAT 
EXCEPTION. 
As both Mr. Marquez and the State agree, the cases of 
State v. Davie, 121 Utah 189, 240 P.2d 245 (1952) and Clayton 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 Utah 331, 85 P.2d 819 
(1938) demonstrate the foundational requirements for admission 
of evidence as a business records exception to the hearsay 
rule (p. 13). However, the State indicates that Mr. Marquez 
must isolate the area of foundational insufficiency. 
Mr. Marquez contends that under the standard required 
by Clayton, supra, there was absolutely no offer of testimony 
to show the necessity of admitting records without requiring 
the person making the entry to testify, and that all other 
testimony was insufficient to satisfy the remaining require-
ments. 
Mr. Marquez also challenges the use of State v. Polson, 
93 Idaho 912, 478 P.2d 292 Cert. denied 402 U.S. 930 (1971) 
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as applicable authority for the proposition that when a 
fingerprint record has been produced from official custody a 
sufficient foundation has been laid for its admission. The 
Polson, supra, case is distinguishable on its facts. There, 
the records introduced from official custody were "certified" 
records held by the Records Administrator of the Idaho Sta~ 
Penitentiary who was also the person whose testimony was 
taken. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION LAID 
TO INSURE THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE 
FINGERPRINT CARD ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. 
The State alleges (p. 18) that fingerprints are not 
subject to change over a period of time, or that it is 
impossible to create a spurious fingerprint. On the contracy, 
Mr. Marquez asks the court to recognize the possibility that 
in a system where personnel change often and where prints 
are kept in unsealed envelopes, the possibility exists that 
prints can be mutilated or destroyed, interchanged or mis-
placed. Further, Mr. Marquez is not required to demonstra~ 
any credible motive for an individual to interfere with the 
integrity of fingerprints, since intentional interferance ~ 
an individual is not the sole means by which evidence could 
be rendered incompetent. 
In this instance, the State at tempts to analogize chain 
of custody standards for latent prints (p. 19). Again, the 
State misunderstands. To establish the chain of custody 
-8-
i 
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for a latent print, particularly where the print was taken 
in connection with the offense for which a defendant is 
being tried is not analagous for it is a much less compli-
cated situation in which the time span between the finding 
of the print and its introduction is relatively short. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
THE DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Three cases are cited by the State as illustrations of 
instances in which fingerprints found in the area of a crime 
were sufficient indications of guilt so as to uphold a 
conviction. Yet, each case is distinguishable. In State v. 
Washington, 17 Utah 2d 149, 405 P.2d 793 (1965), the print 
of defendant Washington was found inside a burglarized 
house. In Harvey v. People, 495 P.2d 204 (Co.a. 1972), the 
identifying print was on a bottle lying directly next to the 
victim of a murder. In State v. Tew, 234 N.C. 612, 688 
S.E. 2d 291 (1951), the fingerprint evidence was on a piece 
of glass found inside a burglarized building. 
In fact, the Colorado Supreme Court in Harvey v. People, 
~, set aside the conviction of the defendant and remanded 
-9-
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based upon insufficient circumstantial evidence, which 
specifically, in the Harvey case, supra, the court said: 
To satisfy the requirements of proof in 
a circumstantial case, the fingerprints 
which correspond to those of the accused 
must be found in the place where the 
crime was committed under such circum-
stances as to rule out the possibility 
that they could have been impressed 
at a time other than when the crime was 
co~.mitted. P.207. 
This, of course, is not the situation in the instant 
case where the one latent print admitted at trial had been 
lifted two days after a burglary from a basement windmv 
through which no access to the burglarized portion of the 
home could be had. 
DATED this day of December, 1976. 
JAMES T. MASSEY 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
/ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Reply Brief of Appellant to Vernon B. Romney, Attorney 
General for the State of Utah, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and to Mr. Earl F. Darius, 
Assistant Attorney General, 2 36 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of December, 1976. 
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